How do I protect a source's photos and their metadata on my phone?

A source sends you a photo from inside a building they should not be in. Another hands you their phone for a minute to AirDrop a screenshot. You now hold something that can identify them, by their face, by a reflection, or by data inside the file that you cannot see. This page covers where to keep source material on your phone, how to redact it, and how to share it without the details. We checked each step against the Freedom of the Press Foundation, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the EFF and Apple’s own pages on 2026-10-08.

What a photo gives away

The Freedom of the Press Foundation says metadata “describes the who, what, when, where, how, and sometimes even why” of a file. In a photo that usually means:

• When. The creation date, down to the second.
• Where. Apple says the Camera app embeds location coordinates “into each photo and video” when it has access to Location Services. People you share with “may be able to access the location metadata and learn where it was taken.”
• What device. Make and model tags tell a reader what phone took it.
• Who, in the image. Faces, tattoos, unique clothing, a name badge, a screen in the background. The EFF reminds people to also block out “tattoos or unique clothing”.

Some of this a source can strip before they send. Most will not know to. So assume every file arrives with all of it.

Keep originals out of the camera roll

A photo in Photos syncs. Apple’s standard iCloud protection keeps the keys “in Apple data centers”, and the Committee to Protect Journalists warns that “your device may back up your data to the cloud account linked to the phone. Information stored in the cloud may not be encrypted.” Our iCloud Photos encryption guide explains when iCloud Photos is end-to-end encrypted and when it is not.

York Vault keeps source files in a separate library on iPhone and Android:

• Share straight in. Use the share sheet to send a file from Messages, Signal or Files into York Vault. It lands in the library at your next open, without passing through Photos.
• Shoot straight in. The private camera encrypts each photo in memory and saves nothing to Photos. Location is off by default.
• Keep the original whole. York Vault keeps capture date, location and camera data inside the encrypted record, so you can verify a file later. Only you can open it.
• Encrypted backup. The free backup to your own iCloud or Google Drive is encrypted on the phone first, with random names. We hold no key. See end-to-end encryption.

Then remove any copy from Photos and empty Recently Deleted. The import and cleanup page shows each step.

Redact with a box, not a blur

The Freedom of the Press Foundation says some blurring algorithms “may be vulnerable to some deobfuscation methods”, and that “when in doubt, it’s better to completely block a number, face, identifiable tattoo, or whatever you’re trying to cover with something completely opaque.”

1. Work on a copy, never the original.
2. Cover faces, tattoos, screens, plates and documents with a fully opaque box.
3. Check the edges. A reflection in a window or a phone screen can show what you covered.
4. Save the redacted version as a new file.

York Vault’s redact tool finds faces for you and covers them, or chosen text areas, with a blur or a solid black box. It saves a new copy, so the original stays whole. For a source, choose the black box. The York Vault camera can also blur faces at the moment you shoot, with no unblurred copy kept, in Plus. That suits crowd shots, but for a face that must never be recognized, the box is the safer tool.

Share without the details

On iPhone, from Photos:

1. Select the photo and tap the Share button.
2. Tap Options and turn off Location. Apple says Location Not Included then shows above Options.
3. Share it.

To strip location from the photo itself, open it, tap Adjust Info, Adjust Location, then No Location. To stop the camera from saving location at all, go to Settings, Privacy & Security, Location Services, Camera, and tap Never.

From York Vault, shares and exports remove location, dates, camera serial and device model by default, with a preview of what goes. A Keep details switch is there when an editor needs them. See share files safely. A private share link sends a file with its own key, and you can end it before it expires.

The Freedom of the Press Foundation also warns that apps like Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat have processes for handing photos to police. Never upload an unredacted original to a platform, even privately.

Lock the phone itself

The Committee to Protect Journalists gives clear device advice:

• A long passcode. “Longer PINs or passwords are more secure.”
• No biometrics at borders. “If you are crossing borders or are concerned about having your devices seized and searched, turn off biometrics.”
• Power off. CPJ says turning the device off means it “will require a password to unlock” when it starts again.
• Lockdown Mode if you are at high risk of advanced spyware, on every Apple device on the same account.

York Vault adds its own code on top, never the phone passcode. A cover code opens a second, ordinary library if someone makes you open the app. An erase code goes further and destroys the keys to your other libraries. CPJ notes that wiping a device “can come with legal repercussions”, and the same caution applies to an erase code. Know the law where you work before you set one, and read our page on phone searches at the border before you travel. Photographers in a crowd should also read our page on protest photos.